

CASE ANALYSIS: ANOOP BARANWAL V. UNION OF INDIA CITATION: [2023] 9 S.C.R. 1

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INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court of India, in *Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India* ([2023] 9 S.C.R. 1), addressed a critical constitutional question regarding the independence of the Election Commission of India. The case stemmed from concerns about executive dominance in the appointment process of the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) and Election Commissioners (ECs). By scrutinizing the framework under Article 324(2) of the Indian Constitution, the Court sought to ensure that the ECI remains an independent and impartial body for safeguarding democratic values.

The five-judge Constitutional Bench comprising Justices K.M. Joseph, Ajay Rastogi, Aniruddha Bose, Hrishikesh Roy, and C.T. Ravikumar delivered a landmark judgment that introduced significant changes to the selection process of ECI members.

Factual Background

- Article 324(2):** Article 324(2) entrusts the President with the power to appoint the CEC and ECs, subject to any law made by Parliament. However, in the absence of such a law, the appointments have been made solely based on the advice of the executive.
- Challenges to Executive Monopoly:** Critics argued that executive control over the appointment process poses a threat to the independence of the ECI, potentially compromising the fairness of elections.
- Public Interest Litigation:** Anoop Baranwal filed a writ petition before the Supreme Court, highlighting the constitutional vacuum in the appointment process. He contended that this vacuum allowed political interference in the functioning of the ECI,

which undermines its role as a neutral arbiter in elections.

Key Constitutional Issues

- Does the existing appointment process compromise the independence of the ECI, violating the Basic Structure Doctrine?
- Can the judiciary mandate a selection process in the absence of parliamentary legislation without violating the separation of powers?
- Should a collegium-like system be introduced to make the appointment process more transparent and impartial?

Arguments Advanced by the Parties

Petitioner's Contentions

- Erosion of Independence:**
 - The petitioner argued that the independence of the ECI,

essential for free and fair elections, is compromised under the current system. Citing *Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala*¹, the petitioner emphasized that free and fair elections are integral to the Basic Structure of the Constitution.

2. Arbitrary Executive Control:

- The existing process gives unchecked power to the executive to appoint ECI members, violating the principle of non-arbitrariness under Article 14.

3. Comparative Mechanisms:

- Reference was made to other independent bodies, such as the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) and the Lokpal, where multi-stakeholder committees are involved in appointments to ensure impartiality.

4. Recommendations Ignored:

- The petitioner highlighted various reports recommending reforms in ECI appointments:
 - **255th Law Commission Report (2015):** Advocated for a collegium system involving the Prime Minister, Leader of Opposition, and Chief Justice of India.
 - **Justice Tarkunde Committee Report (1975):** Urged for a statutory mechanism to ensure ECI's independence.

5. Judicial Precedents:

- Cases such as *Vineet Narain v. Union of India*² and *Prakash Singh v. Union of India*³ were cited, where the judiciary intervened to establish guidelines for maintaining the independence of public institutions.

Respondent's Contentions (Union of India)

1. Parliamentary Prerogative:

- The executive argued that Article 324(2) explicitly allows Parliament to regulate appointments, and the absence of such legislation does not render the existing process unconstitutional.

2. Separation of Powers:

- The judiciary's intervention in the appointment process would violate the doctrine of separation of powers enshrined under Article 50.

3. Functional Independence of ECI:

- The Union argued that the ECI has operated independently despite the current appointment system. No evidence was provided to show bias or compromise in its functioning.

4. Past Practice:

- The executive contended that past appointments of experienced civil servants ensured continuity and expertise, meeting constitutional standards.

Verdict Overview

The Supreme Court of India delivered a unanimous judgment aimed at strengthening the constitutional independence of the Election

¹ (1973) 4 SCC 225

² 1996 SCC (2) 199

³ (2006) 8 SCC 1

Commission of India (ECI). The Court laid down guidelines for the appointment process of the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) and Election Commissioners (ECs) under Article 324(2) of the Constitution until Parliament enacts a specific law. The Court's decision introduced a multi-stakeholder appointment committee and outlined the following key mandates:

1. Composition of the Selection Committee:

- The CEC and ECs shall be appointed by a committee comprising:
 - The Prime Minister,
 - The Chief Justice of India (CJI), and
 - The Leader of the Opposition (or the leader of the largest opposition party in the Lok Sabha, if there is no formally recognized Leader of the Opposition).

2. Judicial Safeguard Against Executive Monopoly:

- This framework ensures that no single authority, particularly the executive, wields disproportionate influence over the appointment process.

3. Interim Measure:

- The ruling explicitly stated that these guidelines are temporary and will cease to operate once Parliament enacts a law under Article 324(2) governing such appointments.

Key Aspects of the Judgment

1. Constitutional Vacuum and Judicial Intervention:

- The Court noted that Article 324(2) provides for parliamentary legislation to regulate the

appointment process, but no such law has been enacted since the Constitution came into force.

- This gap allowed the executive to have unchecked control over the process, which could potentially compromise the independence of the ECI.
- Citing *Vishakha v. State of Rajasthan*⁴, the Court reiterated that in the absence of legislation, the judiciary has the authority to step in and establish guidelines to prevent constitutional violations.

2. Role of the Election Commission in a Democracy:

- The Court emphasized that the ECI plays a pivotal role in ensuring free and fair elections, which are foundational to India's democracy.
- Any dilution of the ECI's independence undermines the trust and confidence of citizens in the electoral process.

3. Basic Structure Doctrine:

- Relying on the *Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala*⁵ judgment, the Court observed that free and fair elections are part of the Basic Structure of the Constitution.
- To protect this Basic Structure, it is essential to ensure the institutional integrity and autonomy of the ECI.

4. Global Best Practices:

- The judgment referenced the appointment processes of

⁴ (1997) 6 SCC 241

⁵ (1973) 4 SCC 225

independent electoral bodies in countries like:

- **South Africa:** Electoral Commission members are appointed by a multiparty committee.
- **United States:** Election bodies have bipartisan involvement in appointments.
- These examples highlighted the need for a transparent and impartial selection process in India.

5. **Balance of Power and Checks:**

- The inclusion of the Chief Justice of India in the selection committee acts as a safeguard against any executive overreach.
- Similarly, involving the Leader of the Opposition ensures that appointments reflect broader political consensus.

6. **Judicial Precedents:**

- The Court cited cases like *Vineet Narain v. Union of India* (1998) and *Prakash Singh v. Union of India* (2006), where judicial guidelines were issued to fill legislative voids in appointment processes for other institutions such as the Central Vigilance Commission and police reforms.

Guidelines for Implementation

1. **Selection Process:**

- The selection committee shall meet and deliberate to identify the most qualified candidates for the roles of CEC and ECs.
- The process should be transparent, merit-based, and free from political or executive bias.

2. **Role of Parliament:**

- The Court directed Parliament to enact a comprehensive law under Article 324(2) to institutionalize the appointment process.
- It emphasized that the judiciary's intervention is a temporary mechanism and that the ultimate responsibility lies with the legislature.

3. **Safeguards Against Arbitrary Appointments:**

- Appointments made through the selection committee will be subject to judicial review if allegations of bias or procedural violations arise.
- This ensures accountability in the new system.

Impact of the Judgment

1. **Strengthening Electoral Integrity:**

- The judgment ensures that the ECI remains a neutral body, independent of political or executive pressures, thereby enhancing its credibility in conducting free and fair elections.

2. **Encouraging Legislative Action:**

- By urging Parliament to legislate on the matter, the Court reinforced the importance of long-term structural reforms in electoral governance.

3. **Setting a Precedent for Institutional Independence:**

- The judgment may inspire similar reforms in other constitutional or statutory bodies, such as the Central Information Commission or the Comptroller and Auditor General, where executive

influence in appointments is a concern.

4. Critique and Debate on Judicial Activism:

- While the decision has been widely lauded for its forward-looking approach, some critics argue that it encroaches on legislative powers, challenging the doctrine of separation of powers.

Judicial Observations on Broader Electoral Reforms

While the judgment primarily dealt with the appointment process, the Bench also made observations on broader reforms to strengthen India's electoral system, including:

1. Financial Independence of the ECI:

- The Court emphasized the need to reduce dependence on the executive for budgetary allocations, suggesting a dedicated and independent budget for the ECI.

2. Code of Conduct for Political Parties:

- The judgment recommended stronger enforcement mechanisms for violations of the Model Code of Conduct during elections.

3. Transparency in Electoral Funding:

- Observations were made on the necessity of reforming opaque mechanisms, such as electoral bonds, to ensure transparency in campaign financing.

Conclusion

The judgment in *Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India* is a watershed moment for electoral democracy in India. By addressing a long-standing constitutional vacuum, the Supreme Court has strengthened the independence and impartiality of the Election Commission of India.

The ruling reflects the judiciary's proactive role in upholding democratic principles and ensuring the effective functioning of constitutional institutions. At the same time, it underscores the urgent need for legislative action to institutionalize these reforms and maintain a balance of powers among the executive, legislature, and judiciary.

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